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ENDORSEMENT
BY THE COURT:
The Ministry of Health received a request from a citizen who had
been previously assaulted by the patient with a knife seeking access to
information with respect to the patient's detention and release from a
psychiatric hospital in which the patient was detained having been found not
guilty by reason of insanity on 2 counts of attempt murder. The Ministry denied
the request pursuant to s. 65(2)(a) and (b) of the Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). An appeal to the Commissioner was
taken by the requester from this decision.
The Commissioner ordered production of the pertinent records
pursuant to the Commissioner's powers to order production under s. 52(4) of the
Act in order to determine the preliminary issues of the inquiry officer's
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in view of s. 65(2) of the Act which
renders the Act inapplicable in respect of "clinical records" under s. 1 of the
Mental Health Act. The Ministry seeks judicial review of this order
which is designated Order P-623.
The relevant sections of the Act are set out as follows:
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65.(1) This Act does not apply to records placed in the
Archives of Ontario by or on behalf of a person or organization other than an
institution.
(2) This Act does not apply to a record In respect of a
patient in a psychiatric facility as defined by section 1 of the Mental
Health Act, where the record,
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(a) is a clinical record as defined by
subsection 35(1) of the Mental Act; or
(b) contains information
in respect of the history, assessment, diagnosis, observation, examination,
care or treatment of the patient. |
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52. (4) In an inquiry, the Commissioner may require to be
produced to the Commissioner and may examine any record that Is in the custody
or under the control of an institution, despite Parts II and III of this Act or
any other Act or privilege, and may enter and inspect any premises occupied by
an institution for the purposes of the investigation. |
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The Inquiry Officer held that s. 65(2) did not bar the
Commissioner or the Inquiry Officer from determining its own jurisdiction by in
turn determining whether the records requested fell within the definition of
medical records under s. 35(1) of the Mental Health Act.
At pp. 2-3, the Inquiry Officer stated the following:
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The appeal provisions of the Act provide that any decision
of the head of an Institution relating to access to records can be appealed by
the requester to the Commissioner. The Commissioner (or his delegate) has the
statutory duty to dispose of the issues raised in an appeal, and makes
decisions in respect of an appeal by issuing an order pursuant to section 54(1)
of the Act, which states:
After all of the evidence for an inquiry has been
received, the Commissioner shall make an order disposing of the issues raised
by the appeal.
In my view, section 65(2) can apply only to the records
which fall within the scope of that section. While the Legislature clearly
intended that these records should fall outside the purview of the Act, I do
not believe that the Legislature intended to have the threshold issue of
whether or not records fall within the scope of this provision determined by a
non-independent body, such as the Ministry, whose decision would not be
reviewable.
While the Ministry must determine at first instance whether
section 65(2) applies precluding access to the requester, the Commissioner,
too, must be satisfied of the relevance and application of the provision to the
records upon receipt of an appeal. This duty of the Commissioner is fundamental
to the effective operation of the Act, the principle of providing a right of
access to information under section 1(a), and the principle that decisions on
the disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of
government under section 1(a)(iii).
In my view, notwithstanding a claim by the Ministry that the
records in question fall within the scope of section 65(2), the Commissioner
(or his delegate) does have the power to compel the production of records
claimed to be covered by section 65(2).
This power to compel initially would be exercised for the
limited purpose of determining whether or not the records fall within the scope
of section 65(2) of the Act. If, having reviewed the records, I determine that
the Ministry's claim is correctly made, pursuant to section 65(2) the records
would be returned to the Ministry and the appeal would be closed, since I would
not have the jurisdiction to conduct a further inquiry. However, if I determine
that the Ministry's claim is not validly made with respect to some or all of
the records (i.e., that section 65(2) does not apply to some or all of the
records), then I will be required to proceed with the inquiry and determine the
application of the Act to the records. |
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We are in agreement with the assessment by the Inquiry Officer
that s. 65(2) does not prohibit the Inquiry Officer from determining whether
she had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and also with her approach to that
issue. We would only add that any preliminary determination that the Inquiry
Officer either did or did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal based
on whether the record was a "clinical record" within s. 65(2) of the Act would
be subject to judicial review on a standard of correctness.
Further, we are of the view that s. 52(4) explicitly authorizes
the Commissioner in an inquiry to have produced any document and more
specifically the pertinent records in this case. We do not accept the
submission of counsel for the Ministry of Health that the phrase, "despite
Parts II and III of this Act" in s. 52(4) confines the application of s. 52(4)
to those parts of the Act. If that result had been intended the Legislature
could have readily conveyed that intention in clear arid unambiguous terms. We
are all of the view that s. 52(4) applIes to all parts of the Act. In our view,
the Commissioner must have the procedural mechanism necessary to decide matters
of substance.
In accepting the approach taken by the Commissioner to ss. 65(2)
and 52(4) of the Act, we take comfort in the decision of this court in Re
Morgan et al. and Windsor R.C.S.S. Board (1979), 112 D.L.R. (3d) 163 (Ont.
Div. Ct.) where at p. 168 is found the following:
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Finally, I wish to turn to Re Ontario Labour Relations
Board: Bradley et al. v. Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd., [1957] O.R.
316, 8 D.L.R. (2d) 65 and particularly at pp. 334—5 OR., p. 81 D.L.R.,
where in dealing with the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal, Roach, J.A.,
for the Court says:
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When the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal to
decide what I will call the main question before it, depends upon a collateral
matter it must, of course, decide that preliminary or collateral matter. It can
decide it only on evidence. If there is no evidence then the existence of the
facts on which the tribunal's jurisdiction to proceed further depends, has not
been established and the tribunal is without jurisdiction to proceed further.
If there is evidence then the tribunal weighs it and concludes that the facts
on which its further jurisdiction depends either have or have not been proven
to exist. |
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This passage makes it clear that an inferior tribunal
must, as a preliminary to deciding the main question before it, make a decision
upon a collateral or preliminary matter affecting its jurisdiction.
[emphasis added] |
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See also: Langlois v. Minister of Justice of Quebec (1984),
9 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 330 S.C.C.); Jacmain v. A.G. Canada (1977), 81
D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 6 (S.C.C.).
Finally, we do not accept the Ministry's submission that ss. 8 and
35 of the Mental Health Act preclude the Commissioner from determining
jurisdiction under s. 65(2) of the Act by requiring production of the records
pertinent to that determination pursuant to s. 52(4) of the Act.
For these reasons the application for judicial review is
dismissed. We accede to the request of the Ministry to stay the order of this
court pursuant to Rule 63.02(1)(a)(i). This is not a matter for costs.
Carruthers J. Then J. Adams
J.
Released: June 29, 1994 |