(See as well, cases summarized under s.24 [FIPPA] \ s.17 [MFIPPA].)

ss.(1)

• The requester has an obligation to provide as much direction as possible to an institution in locating records. A request for "all" records may not be sufficiently descriptive for the purposes of the section. (Orders #P-33, P-34, P-35, P-44, P-45, M-865)

• If an institution narrows its area of search based on its interpretation of the request, the interpretation and narrowed field of search should be communicated to the requester. (Orders #P-33, P-34)

• An institution that receives a broadly worded request can (a) respond literally, (b) request clarification, (c) unilaterally narrow the search and outline the limits of the narrowed search to requester. (Order #P-38)

• This provision does not contravene the Charter in ss.7 and 11(d). Even though the requested information was a Crown brief deriving from a prosecution, s.11(d) of the Charter did not apply in this context because proceedings under the Act are not in respect of an individual "charged with an offence." The appellant also failed to establish why s.7 of the Charter was contravened. (Order #P-743)

ss.(2)

• Access under the Act has not been given where an official from an institution allows an individual to read a record. In this case the institution allowed the individual to read a complaint letter, and later refused the individual access to the letter in response to an access request. The intention of the institution is an important factor in determining whether access under the Act has been provided. One essential element of intention is whether the institution considered the notice requirements of the Act when the individual was allowed to read the documents. In order to be provided with access for the purposes of the Act, there must be some evidence that the institution has treated the matter as coming under the provisions of the Act. (Orders #P-162, M-180, P-274)

• This provision only requires notification where an institution is considering granting access to personal information in circumstances where disclosure might constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. If, after reviewing the record, an institution decides not to disclose the personal information, or if it decides that disclosure would not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy, notification is not required. (Order #P-738)

ss.(3)

• The institution does not have an unfettered right to decide which method of access the requester may have. The institution must use the same criteria as provided in s.30 [FIPPA\s.23 [MFIPPA] when deciding whether to grant the method of access preferred by the requester. The Commission noted that it would be inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the Act to interpret this section in such a way as to accord a lesser right of access to a person making a request for personal information than for someone making a request for general records. (Orders #P-233, P-541, P-820)

• It is up to an institution, on a case-by-case basis, to satisfy itself as to a requester's identity before releasing personal information to the individual. (Order #P-29)

• Where records of proceedings are available by tape and transcript, the obligation of the institution in respect of granting access under this section depends on the interpretation given to the request. In this case, the institution provided the requester with a transcript of the proceedings and not the tape. The Commission ruled that the request was not for the tape and that therefore access to the transcript was sufficient. In these circumstances, the institution is not obliged to further clarify the matter with the requester. (Order #P-572)

• The Commission held that while the Criminal Code Review Board did not have to send the original versions of the audio tapes of its hearings to a requester, it had a duty to copy the tapes on the request of the requester. The Commission also held that it had no duty to transcribe the tapes where as here the requester was not seeking transcripts. The Commission found that reproducing the tapes was straight-forward and did not require expensive or complicated equipment. (Order #P-820)

• It is not "reasonably practicable" for a requester to view records in person where to do so would require an institution to compile the records from two locations and provide staff to accompany the requester while he examines the records. In this case, the appellant had also received copies of records which were not exempt. (Order #P-1108)

ss.(4)

• A request in the form of questions is acceptable when seeking personal information, but not when seeking general information. (Order #P-54)

• This provision creates a duty to ensure that the average person can comprehend the record. A head is under no duty to assess whether an individual requester can comprehend the record. A perception that the requester may not understand the record cannot justify refusal to disclose. (Orders #P-19, P-540, M-199, M-276)

• The word "comprehensible" must be interpreted according to an objective standard. Given that ss.1, 11(1)(a) and 11(2) of the Human Rights Code (Code) apply to the disclosure of information to requesters under the Act, disclosure to requesters who are visually impaired must be in compliance with the Code. In this case, the institution recognized the requester's special needs by authorizing the requester's vocational rehabilitation counsellor to spend several hours with him to discuss the contents of the file and by transcribing 39 pages of the file in enlarged print. The requester also reviewed his file in the company of his wife, who was not visually impaired. The institution would have had to expend $2,668 to transcribe the entire file into enlarged print. In the circumstances, the Commission found that the institution took steps to assist the requester to understand his file and allowed him to effectively access his personal information. The Commission ruled that the Code was not contravened. (Order #P-540)

• Where handwritten records of an institution are difficult to read, the test for whether the institution has to type the records or otherwise prepare the record in "comprehensible" form is whether the "average" person could understand the record. However, the police in this case used codes in the handwritten notes which the Commission held would not be comprehensible to the average person. The Commission ruled that the police had a duty to translate the codes into language which would be comprehensible to the average person. (Order #M-199)

• Where personal psychiatric information was ordered disclosed to the requester, the Commission encouraged him to have his physician review the records first so that psychiatric terms that were not explained in the report could be explained to him. (Order #P-675)